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0. Introduction
In this paper we attempt to analyze some typical problems involving in-
dicative and subjunctive conditionals in English within the framework of
Barwise's(1985) situation semantics approach. Concentrating on commonly
quoted conditional statements about Oswald's assassination of Kennedy,
we first review and criticize Davis's(1979) possible worlds approach based
on the notion of partial similarity and then Ellis's(1978) unified account
of conditionals based on a theory of rational belief systems. Here we argue
against Davis's truth conditional approach that differentiates indicative con-
ditionals from subjunctive conditionals.
We, on the other hand, agree with Ellis on the claim that both an in-
dicative and its corresponding subjunctive conditional in general express
the same conditional knowledge or belief but do so from different tem-
poral vantage points. But we reject his treatment because of its failure to
account for some critical problems.
Having rejected Davis's and Ellis's approaches, we finally adopt Bar-
wise's approach with its emphasis on the informative rather than truth-
conditional aspect of statements. By clearing up some points in Bar-
wise's(1985) treatment of conditionals, we show that those classic examples
which have been claimed to be counterexamples to a unified theory are
nothing but temporal instantiations of one and the same general conditional.
1. Arguments against Davis's Possible worlds Approach
In order properly to interpret a natural language conditional, Stalnaker
(1968) adds a selection function to a model structure which maps a pro-
position and an actual world into the closest possible world. Unlike a
material conditional in truth-functional logic, he claims that the truth value
of a conditional in natural language depends on the truth value of its con-
sequent relative to some possible world in which the antecedent is true and
which otherwise differs minimally from the actual world. However, he holds
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the position that indicative and subjunctive conditionals have the same truth
condition.
Rejecting this equivalence position, Davis (1979) modifies Stalnaker's
possible worlds framework by introducing the notion of partial similarity.
He adopts two selection functions, an i-function for defining the truth con-
dition of an indicative conditional and an s-function for a subjunctive con-
ditional. In selecting the closest possible world in which the antecedent is
true, the i-function reviews the whole actual history, while the s-function
considers only its part, that part of the history prior to the time referred
to in the antecedent. He then defines the truth conditions of an indicative
and a subjunctive conditional.
1)
The indicative conditional A — > C is true iff C is true in i(A), where i(A)
is the closest possible world in which A is true.
(2)
The subjunctive conditional A > C is true iff C is true in s(A), where s(A)
is the A-world that is most similar to the actual world before t(A), the time
reference of A.
Consider now how these truth conditions apply to the interpretation of
the following conditionals:
(3) a. If Oswald didn't kill Kennedy, someone else did.
b. If Oswald didn't kill Kennedy, Kennedy is still alive.
(4) a. If Oswald hadn't killed Kennedy, someone else would have.
b. If Oswald hadn't killed Kennedy, Kennedy would have been still
alive.
In interpreting these conditionals, Davis assumes that Oswald acted alone
in killing Kennedy so that in his assumed actual world, the following do
not hold:
(5) a. X: Oswald did not kill Kennedy.
b. Y: Someone else killed Kennedy.
c. Z: Kennedy was not killed.
Then there should be two possible worlds in which X does hold but which
otherwise is minimally different from this actual world, a world wl in which
Y does not hold but Z does and a world w2 in which Y holds but Z does
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not. Here Davis claims that w2 is closer to the actual world than wl because
he thinks that it is less unlikely that kennedy be found alive than that no
one killed Kennedy. Accordingly, the i(X) should be w2 such that we have:
(6) a. X — > Y is true.
b. X — > Z is false.
This means that (3a) is true while (3b), false.
However, Davis shows that the corresponding subjunctive conditionals
(4a) and (4b) have the opposite truth values, namely:
(7) a. X > Y is false.
b. X > Z is true.
This is so because the s-function only reviews that part of the history before
Kennedy's assassination took place. Prior to this event, w 1 is the only possi-
ble alternative. This the s-function selects for interpreting the subjunctive
conditionals.
We argue against Davis's possible worlds approach based on the notion
of partial similarity on two grounds, one technical and the other realistic.
From a technical point, his selection function is not fine-grained enough
to provide a clear basis for preferring one possible world to the other as
the closest possible world i(A), say for choosing w2 over w 1. Depending
on his attitude or prejudice, one may consider w 1 to be more likely than
w2. Suppose, for instance, one can never accept Kennedy's assassination
as most of us could not imagine. In this case, the most conceivable situa-
tion should be the world w 1 in which no one attempted to kill Kennedy.
So, if we assume that Kennedy is still alive, then (3a) is false and (3b), true.
From a realistic point, one may disagree with Davis as to what the ac-
tual history is. Some people still believe in various conspiracy theories and
then there are some who believe that Kennedy is alive somewhere. Suppose
we accept the conspiracy theory that Oswald was to shoot Kennedy first
and then X would if he failed. In this case, in contrary to Davis's prediction
(7), the subjunctive conditional (4a) is true. If we further assume that this
conspiracy has succeeded, then (4b) will be false, which is again contrary
to Davis's prediction.
Davis's argument is based on a set of fallacious assumptions. He first
assumes erroneously that we all know the actual history and have the same
attitude towards the interpretation of the whole or parts of the history.
Secondly, he assumes that conditional statements have intuitively justifiable
fixed truth values like simple facts or laws. This second assumption is possi-
42	 Ki-Yong Lee, Su-Son Yoo
ble only if the first assumption is accepted. In reality there may be a uni-
que actual world for each moment of the history, but we can perceive or
know only some small part of it around us, the rest remaining as parts of
our belief. With these questionable assumptions, Davis has fixed the truth
values of those indicative and subjunctive statements involving Kennedy's
assassination and claimed that his definition of the truth conditions cor-
rectly would predict their truth values.
In our paper, we claim that a truth-conditional approach like Davis's
is fruitless for treating conditionals. As we have seen, the truth value of
a conditional depends on one's background belief or knowledge and so it
is meaningless to ask whether a certain conditional statement is true or false
as if everyone had a fixed set of pieces of common belief or knowledge.
It should be more fruitful to ask what kind of belief or knowledge the
speaker is going to convey by making a conditional statement. If taken in-
to account from this point of view, both indicative and subjunctive condi-
tionals are seen to convey the same information content. Consider Kennedy's
assassination examples again. Both (3a) and (4a) convey the information
that Kennedy is bound to be killed possibly because of some conspiracy
in which Oswald is one of the would-be assassins. The same information
can also be conveyed by the following conditionals:
(8) If Oswald doesn't kill Kennedy, someone else will.
(9) If Oswald hasn't killed Kennedy, someone else will have.
But there is a difference in vantage point among these conditionals: the
present tensed conditional (8) is appropriately uttered before the planned
assassination time, but the past or perfect conditionals (3a), (4a) and (9)
only after that time. Furthermore, each of the latter statements may con-
vey an additional piece of information about the speaker's background
knowledge: from (9) we learn that the speaker does not know whether
Oswald has succeeded or not, nor whether Kennedy was killed or not; from
(3a), that the speaker knows that Kennedy was killed, but does not know
whether Oswald was the assassin; finally, from (4a), that the speaker may
know both that Kennedy was killed and that his assassin was Oswald.
Unlike the truth-conditional approach, the information searching ap-
proach thus shows that various tensed types of a conditional convey the
same information about some relation between the antecedent and the con-
sequent situations. Their differences are shown to be due to differences in
the speaker's temporal vantage point. In the following section, we discuss
Ellis (1978), who takes a similar approach to the analysis of conditionals.
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2. Arguments against Ellis's Approach
Adopting a theory of rational belief systems, Ellis(1978) proposes a
general theory of conditionals that treats both indicative and subjunctive
conditionals as expressing the same beliefs but doing so in different ways
and against different backgrounds of knowledge or belief. He defines the
truth or acceptability condition of a conditional as follows:
(10)
A conditional A -- > C is accepted as true in a rational belief system B only
if the belief that C is false does not occur in any complete-extension of a
belief system B'A which is obtained from B in some way making the sup-
position that A.
Types of conditionals are differentiated according to how B 'A is defined
from B. If the extended belief system B' A
 consists of the set of original beliefs
B plus a belief about A, then we have a material conditional. On the other
hand, both indicative and subjunctive conditionals are claimed to be of the
same type, the variably strict type with B 'A consisting of the set of
necessarily true beliefs and possible beliefs with the supposition that A. These
two are regarded as variant locutions of the same type of conditional.
In order to show this, he discusses conditionals of the following forms:
(11) a. If X occurs on occasion 0, then Y will occur on this occasion.
b. If X occurred on occasion 0, then Y (would have) occurred on this
occasion.
c. If X had occurred on occasion 0, then Y would have occurred on
this occasion.
They all contain the same piece of information concerning a conditional
prediction, but differ from each other in tense and mood, and hence only
in the circumstances in which it would be appropriate to assert them. The
indicative present tensed conditional (a) makes an conditional prediction
that is to be confirmed if and only if both X and Y are found to occur.
Its past tense version (b) expresses the same conditional belief, but does
so only in retrospect. The past subjunctive conditional (c) is again the same
conditional prediction made retrospectively, but against the background
knowledge that X did not occur.
However, Ellis fails to see how his theory applies to ordinary conditionals
in English. He, for instance, considers the following set of indicative and
subjunctive conditionals as a counterexample to his theory that they ex-
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press the same belief.
(12) a. If Oswald did not kill Kennedy, then someone else did.
b. If Oswald had not killed Kennedy, then someone else would have.
c. If Oswald does not kill Kennedy, then someone else will.
Here, he claims that (a) and (b) do not express the same belief, for he thinks
that a rational man may accept (a) while rejecting (b). He argues that (a)
is possibly a material conditional epistemically equivalent to
(13) Someone killed Kennedy.
He continues to argue that only (c) and its past tense version (b) express
a conditional prediction, but that (a) does not.
We, however, reject Ellis's analysis of these conditionals. We claim that
they all can express the same belief or knowledge of a conspiracy concern-
ing Kennedy's assassination. (c) conveys the information about a conspiracy
of killing Kennedy in which Oswald is involved and (b) also conveys the
same information from a different temporal vantage point, that is, long
after the plot was conjured. Just like (b) and (c), (a) may convey the exact-
ly same information about Oswald's involvement in killing Kennedy and
does so only after the time of the conspiracy has passed. The only difference
between (a) and (b) is found in the speaker's attitude: (a) can be appropriate-
ly uttered only if the speaker knows that Kennedy was killed, whereas (b)
may be appropriately uttered even if the speaker does not know it. To adopt
Ellis's terminology, these differences affect the assertibility condition on-
ly, but not the acceptability condition.
The conditional (a) may also describe a situation in which Oswald was
supposed to kill Kennedy without implicating his involvement in a con-
spiracy. Because of this possible interpretation, (a) is often regarded as total-
ly different from (b) in expressing a conditional belief. However, this in-
terpretation should not be confused with Ellis's interpretation of (a) as a
material conditional. If (a) were to be a material conditional based on (13),
then it should not be different from the following statement:
(14) If his brother didn't kill Kennedy, someone else did.
But they are two different statements, one about Oswald and the other about
the brother. We know that the statement (14) has no ground for justifica-
tion unless his brother was also involved in the assassination attempt.
Secondly, we argue against Ellis's claim that a past tensed subjunctive
conditional is appropriately uttered only against the background knowledge
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that the situation described by its antecedent did not occur. But as we pointed
out, a subjunctive like (b) may be uttered simply to convey the informa-
tion about a past conspiracy in which Oswald participated without know-
ing Oswald's success in the assassination and even without implicating any
overall success of the plot.
Thirdly, we argue against Ellis's centering requirement on a rational belief
system:
(15) a. weak requirement: E(B) E (B' A) if TA E B
b. strong requirement: B'A = B if TA E B
Consider the strong requirement that the extended belief system B'A re-
mains the same as the original belief system B if A is already accepted as
true in B. According to this rquirement, the following statement is found
to be accepted as true with respect to B if the consequent is accepted as true
(16) If the weather is fine today, then I had bacon and eggs for breakfast
yesterday.
As Ellis points out, this is counterintuitive. He, however, claims that this
is not a real problem because statements like (16) are rarely asserted or
denied. He does not explain why this is the case. His theory of conditionals
fails to show why conditionals like (16), the antecedents and consequents
of which are 'epistemically and theoretically unrelated' , should not be ac-
cepted as true. This problem involving irrelevance between the antecedent
and the consequent of a conditional can easily be resolved in Barwise's situa-
tion semantics approach. This and other problems involving Kennedy's
assassination examples shall be treated in the next section within the
framework of situation semantics.
3. Extension of Barwise's Approach
Barwise(1985) shows how various types of conditionals can be accom-
modated into one unified theory. He claims in particular that there is no
theoretical difference between mathematical and natural language condi-
tionals because the language of mathematics is part of natural language.
He also treats both indicative and subjunctive conditionals as expressing
the same conditional knowledge. He then proposes that the semantics of
conditional statements can best be developed within situation semantics
which takes the notion of subject matter seriously.
A conditional statement of the form [if A, the B] is treated as describ-
ing a constraint C, an involvement relation between a situation type describ-
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ed by the antecedent A and a situation type described by the consequent
C. Consider the following example:
(17) If Oswald does not kill Kennedy, then someone else will.
This conditional is interpreted as stating that Oswald's not killing Kennedy
means someone else's doing it. Such an involvement may be represented
formally as follows:
(18) C17 =(S17 = => S'17)
S17 = [s/ in s: at i; killing, Kennedy, Oswald; 0]
S'17 = [s/ in s: at 1; killing, Kennedy, X; 1]
where the location 1 is temporally preceded by the present loca-
tion ld referred to by the speaker of (17).
As a parameterized constraint, this involvement means that for every an-
choring of 1 to some real location l', any situation sl of the type S17(1')
is part of some s2 of the type S' 17(1'). In other words, when the parameter
1 is fixed to some real location 1', every situation of Oswald's failing to
kill Kennedy at the location 1' in the future is part of some situation in
which someone else X will kill him at that time 1'. So, cases like (16) whose
antecedent is irrelevant to its consequent are not allowed in situation seman-
tics. (Here, we are ignoring for the moment the possibility of a sequential
reading of (17): only after Osald fails, someone else will kill Kennedy.)
But this kind of a general conditional usually expresses a conditional,
or parametric constraint which depends on the prevailing background con-
dition to be actual. Such a parametric constraint C taking B as its parameter
is represented as C/B. To be an actual constraint, the conditional knowledge
described by C17 again depends on the prevailing background condition
B17 that includes such facts as:
(19) a. Kennedy is bound to be killed.
b. Oswald is supposed to kill Kennedy.
On the basis of this kind of a general conditional expressing a parametric
constraint, we can obtain various types of specific conditionals by assign-
ing values to each parameter in the antecedent and consequent situation
types and the background condition. These specific conditionals thus can
convey information if there is an anchoring function f for the parameters
of B such that the utterance situation su is of the type B(f) and, in addi-
tion, if it conveys the information that C/B is actual.
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By examining various problematic cases, Barwise demonstrates that
various kinds of conditionals can be treated adequately with this one general
theory. In his case study he includes the Kennedy assassination examples.
From the perspective of informative communication he sees no difference
between indicative and subjunctive conditional statements. First, he points
out that the past subjunctive conditional (20) corresponds to the present
perfective indicative (21), not to the past indicative (22).
(20) If Oswald had not killed Kennedy, then someone else would have.
(21) If Oswlad has not killed Kennedy, then someone else will have.
(22) If Oswald did not kill Kennedy, then someone else did.
From different vantage points, (20) and (21) could convey the same informa-
tion about Oswald's involvement in assassinating Kennedy. Suppose there
has been a conspiracy in which Oswald or, if he fails, someone else is sup-
posed to kill Kennedy. This information may be conveyed by (21) and later
at the end of the appointed time by the assertion of (20). Barwise, however,
simply dissociates the past indicative conditional (22) from the past subjunc-
tive (20) accepting a possible difference in truth value between them. He
has also failed to show how (22) is instantiated from its corresponding
general conditional, although all specific conditionals are, according to his
claim, instances of some general conditionals.
Besides the corresponding pair (20) and (21), we can easily set up the
following pairs of the present and its corresponding past conditionals:
(23) a. If Oswald does not kill Kennedy, then someone else will.
b. If Oswald did not kill Kennedy, then someone else would.
(24) a. If Oswald does not kill Kennedy, then someone else does.
b. If Oswald did not kill Kennedy, then someone else did.
Now consider under what conditions these conditionals are informative and
what kind of information they convey. For (23a) to be actual, we must have
the prevailing background condition that Kennedy is bound to be killed,
for instance, either because of his unpopularity or by some conspiracy and
that Oswald is supposed to kill him, again either because of his personal
grudge against Kennedy or because he has been hired by some crooks.
Against this background condition, (23a) conveys the information that
Oswald's failure to kill kennedy means, or involves, someone else's killing
him. Just as in the case of (20) and (21), (23b) has the same prevailing con-
dition to be informative and conveys the same information as conveyed
by (23a) but does so from a different temporal vantage point. Because of
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this temporal shifting to the past, the prevailing background condition of
(23b) is temporally anchored to the past so that it is presumed at the time
of utterance that Kennedy was bound to be killed and that Oswald was sup-
posed to kill him.
Our treatment of (24b = 22), however, differs from Barwise's. Against
his claim that dissociates (22) from (20), we argue that the past indicative
(24b = 22) is again an instance of a general conditional conveniently express-
ed by the present indicative (24a). We claim that they both convey the same
information condition and content except that, as in those cited cases (20-21)
and (23a, b), they do so only from different temporal vantage points. But
note that their prevailing background conditions include the same facts
about Kennedy and Oswald as required for the other conditionals to be
actual. We thus find the following discourse acceptable:
(25) Kennedy is a crook, so he must be eliminated. Luckily we got hold
of a fellow named Oswald. If he doesn't kill Kennedy, someone else
does/will.
We also find its past tense version acceptable.
(26) Kennedy was a crook, so he had to be eliminated. Luckily we had got
hold of a fellow named Oswald. If he did not kill Kennedy, someone
else did/must have done, (for he sweared that either he himself or so-
meone else would kill him).
On the other hand, the following are unacceptable:
(27) a. *Kennedy is heavily guarded, so he can't be killed. If Oswald
doesn't kill him, then someone else does/will.
b. *Kennedy was heavily guarded, so it was impossible to kill him.
If Oswald did not kill him, someone else did.
Hence, we consider all these variant types of conditionals specific instances
of one and the same general conditional expressed either by (23a) or (24a).
But unlike the other conditionals, the past indicative (24b) is often claimed
to be a material conditional. This interpretation is possible, according to
our treatment, if the part of its background condition that Kennedy was
to be killed is treated as an accomplished fact that Kennedy was killed. In
this case, the conditional (24b) is equivalent to the disjunctive expression:
(28) Either Oswald killed Kennedy or someone else did.
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But note that the other part of the prevailing background condition that
Oswald was supposed to kill Kennedy must remain valid if (24b) is to ex-
press an actual constraint. If this difference in background condition is,
however, regarded to be significant, as is insisted by Barwise, then the past
conditional (24b) should be treated as being ambiguous:in one case, it is
a case instantiated from (24a) and in another case from some different con-
straint. Since these seem to be no present tense conditional statement in
English describing this particular constraint, the conditional (24b) might
be considered to be a counter example to the claim that every conditional,
whether material, indicative, or subjunctive, is an instance of some general
conditional. One possible solution is to lay a restriction P on the location
1, 1/p, in particular, by restricting the parameterized location in a constraint
to the past, not by anchoring it to the past. If so, we obtain a general
parametric constraint that is instantiated always into a particular past loca-
tion only. But we wish to make a stronger claim that types of conditional
which is claimed to be a material conditional is also an instance of the same
general constraint from which other types of conditional are instantiated
by temporal anchoring. Because of our cognitive structure, the knowledge
of what is bound to occur requires it to be realized and become actual if
time passes. If this constraint applies to the prevailing background condi-
tion B17, then it must be the case that Kennedy's being bound to be killed
implies his actual death if the time i is anchored to some past.
The problem of relevance mentioned at the end of section 2 is no pro-
blem at all in a situation semantics approach for it takes the notion of sub-
ject matter seriously. Since a conditional expresses a constraint between
situation types, nothing irrelevant comes into a statement which purports
to express some involvement relation.
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